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Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples: 
A comparative perspective 
Nicole Hiekel
1 
Aart C. Liefbroer
2 
Anne-Rigt Poortman
3 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Studies explaining why cohabiters are more likely to keep money separate than spouses 
have  mainly focused on selection processes,  without taking into account the 
heterogeneity within both union types in levels of commitment. Cross-national studies 
are rare and have predominantly included Northern and Western European countries, 
the United States, and Canada. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
This study explains the higher likelihood of cohabiters to keep income separate by 
selection as well as commitment factors and explores country differences, including 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
METHODS 
Using data from the Generations and Gender Surveys of Bulgaria, France, Georgia, 
Germany,  Romania,  and  Russia,  N=41,456  cohabiting and married individuals  are 
studied. Binary  logistic regression models of the likelihood that respondents keep 
money separate are calculated. 
 
RESULTS 
Across countries, higher education, female labor market participation,  both partners 
being employed, short union duration, absence of joint children, presence of separation 
thoughts,  and (for cohabiters) a lack of marital intentions are the most persistent 
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correlates of keeping money separate. Differences between cohabiters and married 
couples are reduced when selection and commitment are taken into account, but are still 
significant. Cross-national variation in the effect of cohabitation on keeping separate 
purses is persistent. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Different money management strategies of cohabiters and spouses can be explained to 
some extent by selection processes and inherent differences in the level of commitment 
within cohabitation and marriage. Countries also differ in the socio-economic context 
and norms concerning the way intimate relationships are organized which might lead to 
persistent differences in the way cohabiting and married couples organize their income. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Income pooling strategies, namely, whether couples have a common purse or keep their 
money apart, constitute an important aspect of a co-resident couple’s everyday life, 
regardless of whether the partners are married or not. Income pooling strategies reflect 
how individuals try to resolve the conflict between their  commitment towards the 
partner on the one hand and the maintenance of individual autonomy on the other hand. 
Whether and how cohabiting and married couples differ with respect to income pooling 
strategies is a research topic of growing relevance because cohabitation is becoming 
more common, often preceding or replacing marriage (Kiernan 2001),  and national 
governments aim at regulating its practice. If cohabiters keep money separate  more 
frequently  and if the number of cohabiters continues to increase, the popular 
assumption of policy makers that households share all of their financial assets would be 
challenged. 
A consistent finding in existing research about income pooling strategies of 
cohabiting and married couples has been that cohabiters are more likely to keep money 
separate than their married counterparts (Ashby and Burgoyne 2008;  Bradatan and 
Kulcsar 2008; Elizabeth 2001; Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte 2011; Oropesa, Landale and 
Kenkre 2003; Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins 2006; Winkler 1997). The majority of 
these studies focused on the role of selection. It has been suggested that cohabiters 
differ from married couples before they enter cohabitation (Axinn and Thornton 1992; 
van de Kaa 1993). Hence, individuals with certain characteristics are both effectively 
selected into cohabitation as well as into individual money management.  Our first 
research question therefore is: To what extent do cohabiting and married couples differ 
in the manner in which they manage money and how much of this variation is due to 
selection into one of the two union types?  Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
http://www.demographic-research.org   1529 
Selection may, however, only be part of the story. Differences in the manner in 
which money is managed could also result from inherent  differences between 
cohabitation and marriage;  for instance,  in the level of interpersonal commitment 
(Rhoades, Stanley and Markman 2010; Stanley, Whitton and Markman 2004). It has 
been argued that the most important difference between cohabitation and marriage is – 
besides the legal differences – that cohabiters face a higher level of insecurity about the 
relationship’s future, because cohabitation lacks strong institutional and normative rules 
as well as the public affirmation of the marriage vow (Brines and Joyner 1999; Cherlin 
2004; Winkler 1997). Cohabiting partners are thus expected to be less committed to 
each other, resulting in a lower likelihood of income pooling.  Commitment within 
cohabitation and marriage, however, may vary. First, the economic lives of couples are 
likely  to  get more intertwined with time;  hence, long-term unions have a larger 
tendency to pool economic resources than unions that have lasted for a shorter period of 
time. Second, the presence of joint biological children in the household might indicate a 
joint investment in the relationship that increases interdependence and solidarity 
between partners and might reduce the difference between cohabitation and marriage 
(Seltzer 2004).  Third, doubts about the long-term stability of the union might 
discourage individuals from striving for more financial interdependency. Our second 
research question therefore is: To what extent are the differences between cohabiters’ 
and spouses’ income pooling strategies reduced when the level of interpersonal 
commitment is taken into account?  
A number of studies have shown that cohabiting relationships in which marriage 
plans are present are not qualitatively different from marriages (Brown and Booth 1996; 
Wiik, Bernhardt and Noack 2009). Marital intentions might be a sign of high 
commitment, which reduces the perceived risk of income pooling. But the absence of 
marital intentions does not necessarily imply low commitment to the union,  as 
cohabiters might view their union as an alternative for marriage. Also, the experience of 
premarital cohabitation has been argued as  signaling  lower commitment to the 
relationship, as partners have not been sure enough to marry directly (Forste and Tanfer 
1996).  But  in many countries premarital cohabitation has  become an increasingly 
common way to start a co-resident union (Liefbroer and Billari 2010). 
Barely any prior research has compared income pooling strategies of cohabiting 
and married couples across different cultural and institutional settings. Most studies 
have focused either on the differences between spouses and cohabiters in one country 
(Ashby and Burgoyne 2008;  Elizabeth 2001;  Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte 2011; 
Oropesa, Landale and Kenkre 2003; Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins 2006; Winkler 
1997) or compared married couples across countries (Lauer and Yodanis 2011; Yodanis 
and Lauer 2007).  The only two existing studies that have  compared  married and 
cohabiting couples with regard to their income pooling strategies cross-nationally have Hiekel, Liefbroer & Poortman: Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples 
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found persistent differences between cohabiters and spouses in their income pooling 
strategies after controlling for a limited set of selection and commitment factors, but do 
not identify variation in the effect of cohabitation on money management strategies 
across countries representing very different welfare state regimes (Hamplova and Le 
Bourdais 2009; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003).  
Studying income pooling strategies of cohabiters and spouses in different social 
and cultural contexts increases our understanding of the interplay between institutional 
context, the selection into different union types, the meaning attached to cohabitation, 
and the way intimate relationships are organized. First, when cohabitation is marginal, 
the cohabiting population is more likely to consist of an overrepresentation of 
individuals with specific characteristics that attach one predominant meaning to 
cohabitation.  
Second, countries might vary with regard to the commitment that is involved in 
cohabitation.  In  Western European countries  where most unions start by unmarried 
cohabitation  the level of commitment involved in these unions might vary largely 
across individuals. Whereas some unions might dissolve relatively soon, for others the 
difference between cohabitation and marriage might be blurry, as they view their union 
as a long-term alternative to marriage and are very committed to their relationship. In 
Eastern European countries where cohabitation is marginal and social approval of it is 
low, the commitment involved in cohabiting unions might generally be higher,  as 
cohabitation tends to be short-lived and quickly converted into marriage. 
Third, countries might not only vary with regard to selection into and commitment 
within marriage, but also in cultural and social values associated with cohabitation and 
marriage. Sociologists have posited an individualization  of intimate relationships 
occurring in  contemporary  Western societies,  in which partners  increasingly  value 
individual autonomy and self-realization. In order to maintain individual autonomy and 
the ease of leaving a union that is no longer considered self-fulfilling, pooling income 
might be avoided within individualized unions, leading to an increased likelihood of 
individual money management (Lauer and Yodanis 2011).  
Thus, our third research question is: How do countries differ in the association 
between union type and income pooling strategies?  More specifically, do  we find 
evidence that the country context translates differently  in selection processes into 
cohabitation and the level of commitment involved in cohabitation, and do we find 
indications of different norms concerning money management across Europe that lead 
to persistent cross-national  differences in cohabiters’  and spouses’  income pooling 
strategies, even when taking selection and commitment into account? Using data from 
the Generations and Gender Surveys (GGS), we analyzed data from countries that differ 
widely in the prevalence and institutional context of cohabitation, including not only Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
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two Western European countries, France and Germany, but also countries located in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Russia. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses 
The existing literature offers overwhelming evidence that cohabiters are more likely to 
opt for independent money management than the married,  although contrasting 
explanations for these  differences are proposed. Our first hypothesis concerns the 
replication of the finding that cohabiters are more likely to keep money separate than 
married individuals (Hypothesis 1). The two main explanations for this difference focus 
on the role of selection processes and on inherent differences between marriage and 
cohabitation. 
 
 
2.1 Explanations focusing on selection processes 
The selection argument implies that the same set of factors leads individuals to prefer 
cohabitation  and to opt for individual money  management. First,  age might be 
associated with both union type choice and income pooling strategy. Cohabiters are on 
average younger than married individuals.  Young adults  are more likely  to  be 
economically dependent; for instance, on income provided by parents or study grants. 
Thus they might not yet consider merging their income with their co-resident partner, or 
at least might keep some income separate. 
Second, selection may occur on the basis of cultural characteristics. Within the 
theoretical framework of the Second Demographic Transition the increasing popularity 
of cohabitation  has been argued as  resulting  from  a change in values and attitudes 
concerning family life in a broader sense (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). The highly 
educated have been considered as at the vanguard of this value change. Although at 
later stages of the transition the educational gradient may have become smaller as larger 
parts of the population enter into cohabitation, highly educated individuals have been 
found to be more progressive in their value orientation, less in favor of marriage, and 
more likely to cohabit (Kiernan 2000;  Manting 1996).  Individuals who value 
individualism and personal autonomy are also  more likely to have a preference for 
separate purses in order to maintain financial independence (Elizabeth 2001)  or to 
simply facilitate decision-making on individual expenditure (Ashby and Burgoyne 
2008). Several studies have reported that the higher educated are more likely to keep 
their money separate (Hamplova and Le Bourdais 2009; Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte Hiekel, Liefbroer & Poortman: Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples 
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2011), but see Treas (1993) for contradictory evidence for African-American married 
couples in the US.  
It has also been argued that opting for unmarried cohabitation might be a sign of 
social deprivation. In times of growing globalization and economic  crisis the most 
disadvantaged social strata of society might be more affected by the negative outcomes 
of decreasing job stability and wage protection such as unemployment, job insecurity, 
and economic uncertainty, and more likely to opt for cohabitation as a second best 
option when marriage is not (yet) feasible (Blossfeld, Mills and Klijzing 2005; 
McDonald 2006; Sobotka and Toulemon 2008).  
Religiousness is another cultural resource on the basis of which this type of 
selection might occur. Religious people hold more collectivistic and traditional values 
that oppose unmarried cohabitation (Kiernan 2000; Manting 1996; Thornton, Axinn and 
Xie 2007). Although no empirical evidence is available, it could well be that religious 
people also prefer income pooling because this highlights their unique relationship. 
Selection may also occur on the basis of the division of paid labor within the 
couple. It has been found that couples in which the female partner is strongly attached 
to the labor market are overrepresented among cohabiters (Kiernan 2000). Female labor 
force participation and female earnings have been found to be positively associated with 
independent money management as well (Elizabeth 2001; Hamplova and Le Bourdais 
2009).  Whereas the traditional  male-breadwinner model requires  that the employed 
partner compensate the partner who specializes in home work by pooling economic 
resources, the pre-eminence of specialization is reduced when both partners contribute 
to the household income. Moreover, the bargaining power of the female partner in the 
way the relationship is structured is enhanced when she contributes to the household 
income. 
Earlier life-course experiences could also influence union formation processes and 
the manner in which relationships are organized (Guzzo 2006; Liefbroer, Gerritsen and 
De Jong Gierveld 1994). Individuals who have experienced a divorce have been found 
to be more likely to cohabit (Bumpass and Lu 2000). At the same time the experience 
of a divorce might result in a reluctance to pool resources (Burgoyne and Morison 
1997; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003) as, for instance, previously married respondents 
might have financial obligations towards  their former partner, or children from a 
previous relationship which might make them less willing to pool income with the 
current partner (Burgoyne and Morison 1997). The presence of children from prior 
unions in the household might increase the odds of independent money management, as 
the step-parent might not want to pay for the child brought into the relationship or 
might want to protect the biological parent’s alimony entitlement from his or her former 
partner. Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
http://www.demographic-research.org   1533 
If selection is at play, the observed differences between cohabiters and spouses 
with regard to their income pooling strategies would be spurious, because they result 
from differences in the background characteristics addressed above. In summary, our 
second  hypothesis reads: The  association  between union type and income  pooling 
strategy results from selection processes that shape both the preference for 
cohabitation and for independent money management (Hypothesis 2). 
 
 
2.2 Explanations focusing on inherent differences of cohabitation and marriage 
In contrast to theoretical approaches that focus on selection, some authors have 
emphasized  that differences in the money management strategies of cohabiters and 
spouses might also be explained by inherent differences between cohabitation and 
marriage (Brines and Joyner 1999; Brown and Booth 1996; Nock 1995; Poortman and 
Mills 2012). Often, differences in the commitment of married and cohabiting unions 
have been highlighted. Marriage is a symbol of long-term commitment because it is 
highly institutionalized (Nock 1995). Marriage is a public affirmation that implies 
specific norms, obligations, and formal ties, and leads to “enforceable trust” (Cherlin 
2004). Both financially and socially, marriage implies higher  expectations and exit 
costs than unmarried cohabitation. Married partners are therefore expected to be more 
committed to each other than cohabiters. These differences in commitment are in turn 
expected to translate into differences in the ways in which married and cohabiting 
couples manage their money. Cohabiters face lower exit costs from their cohabiting 
relationship, are more uncertain about the stability of the relationship due to the shorter 
time horizon, and are confronted with more ambiguity regarding social expectations 
about what it means to be a cohabiting partner. The uncertainty about the persistence 
and seriousness of the relationship makes it risky for many cohabiters to pool their 
income (Treas 1993), especially when joint property is not legally protected in the case 
of separation. These differences have been argued as  leading  cohabiters  to  opt for 
independent money management (Winkler 1997). 
Although the level of commitment may generally be lower in cohabitations than in 
marriages it is important to realize that the extent to which these union types differ in 
their level of commitment might depend on specific characteristics of these unions. 
First, union duration might matter. Cohabiting unions increasingly last longer (Sobotka 
and Toulemon 2008). The economic lives of couples most likely get more intertwined 
with time;  hence, long-term unions have a stronger tendency to pool economic 
resources than unions that have lasted a shorter period of time. Treas (1993)  has 
described this as a way to reduce transaction costs within households. Long-term 
cohabiters might thus be as likely as married individuals to pool income with their Hiekel, Liefbroer & Poortman: Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples 
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partners. The difference between spouses’  and cohabiters’  money management 
strategies  might be thus largely due to the overrepresentation of short unions in 
cohabiting relationships. 
Second, across Europe, but also the United States and Canada, the increase in non-
marital childbearing is largely due to increasing births to cohabiting couples (Kiernan 
2001; Raley 2001). A growing number of cohabiters have joint biological children. The 
presence of joint children can represent increasing commitment to the union,  as it 
strengthens the bond between the parents (Seltzer 2000). In turn, children increase the 
need of a couple to coordinate financial affairs. Moreover, a child increases the amount 
of work within a household, which might require at least temporary specialization of 
one partner in unpaid labor. This suggests that couples that share responsibilities for a 
dependent household member are more likely to pool income in order to compensate 
for specialization. The empirical evidence that cohabiters with joint biological children 
differ less from married couples in their money management strategies (Hamplova and 
Le Bourdais 2009; Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte 2011; Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins 
2006)  suggests that the observed difference in the income pooling strategies in 
cohabitation and marriage could be driven  at least to some extent by the  smaller 
proportion of parents among cohabiting couples. 
Third, not all married unions are per se more committed than cohabitations. The 
level of relationship satisfaction has previously  been found to be associated with 
income pooling strategies (Hamplova and Le Bourdais 2009). Individuals who thought 
about separation are less committed to their unions, which in turn might discourage 
income pooling.  Cohabiters have lower exit costs from their unions and might be 
overrepresented among those considering a separation from their partner. 
From these considerations on the role of commitment we derive a third hypothesis: 
The differences in income pooling strategies of cohabiters and the married will be 
reduced once the level of interpersonal commitment in both union types is taken into 
account (Hypothesis 3). 
A final aspect that may influence income pooling both within cohabitation and 
marriage is whether cohabitation is linked to marriage or not. Some cohabiters plan to 
marry while others do not. It is widely assumed that cohabiters with marriage plans are 
more  committed to their relationship  than cohabiters who lack such intentions. 
Cohabiters envisaging marriage have been found to be more likely to pool income than 
cohabiters who do not have marriage plans (Brown and Booth 1996; Hamplova and Le 
Bourdais 2009; Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte 2011). Some spouses cohabit before they 
get married; others marry straight away. When separate purses are more likely during 
cohabitation, married couples who cohabited before marriage might also be more likely 
to continue the money management strategy employed during cohabitation. Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
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So far, no study on income pooling strategies of cohabiting and married couples 
has taken the heterogeneity of both union types into account (but see Poortman and 
Mills 2012 for other arrangements). We distinguish between those (a) cohabiting 
without marital intentions, (b) cohabiting with marital intentions, (c) married with 
premarital cohabitation, and (d) married without premarital cohabitation. We expect 
these four union types to be differently associated with income pooling, suggesting a 
hierarchical order. We expect income pooling to be least likely to occur among 
cohabiters without plans to get married, followed by cohabiters who intend to marry. 
Individuals who have cohabited with their partner before getting married are expected 
to be more likely to pool income than both types of cohabiters, and, finally, income 
pooling is expected to be most likely observed among married couples who married 
directly (Hypothesis 4). 
 
 
2.3 The comparative setting 
Previous research has mainly focused on the income pooling strategies of couples in 
Northern and Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. Much less attention has 
been paid to countries in Central and Eastern Europe – countries that differ in many 
ways and  where significant societal, political, and demographic changes have taken 
place during the last few decades.  The present study examines  income pooling 
strategies of cohabiters and married individuals, comparing countries across Western 
and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, France, Georgia, Germany, Romania, and Russia), which 
allows  exploring  general and context-specific differences between cohabitation and 
marriage. Ultimately, this study helps us to understand the diversity of cohabitation 
across Europe. In the following we briefly contextually situate the countries in our 
study with regard to the prevalence and level of institutionalization of cohabitation. We 
then discuss three reasons why we expect cross-national variation in the effect of union 
type on money management: selection, commitment, and level of individualization in 
cohabitation and marriage. 
Northern European countries have been characterized as  the forerunners in the 
societal diffusion of cohabitation and have been referred to as  “cohabitation land” 
(Syltevik 2010: 448). Western European countries have been considered as following 
suit. In Western Europe cohabitation has replaced direct marriage as the start of a union 
for the vast majority of recent birth cohorts (own calculations based on GGS data, not 
shown). In France cohabiters have been able to register their partnership since 1999, 
when  the  “Loi sur la Concubinage et le  Pacte Civil de Solidarité” (PACS)  was 
promulgated. In legal terms a registered partnership is largely similar to civil marriage. 
Around half of all first births occur within cohabitation (Perelli-Harris et al. 2012). Hiekel, Liefbroer & Poortman: Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples 
1536  http://www.demographic-research.org 
Cohabitation is part of the transition to adulthood in Germany as well.  Several 
institutional constraints and economic incentives encourage cohabiters to marry, and 
marriage and parenthood are strongly linked. A registered partnership 
(Lebensgemeinschaft) as an alternative to civil marriage is available to homosexual but 
not heterosexual couples. 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have been classified at an earlier 
stage of the diffusion process  of cohabitation. Countries like Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Romania,  and Russia  have been characterized as contexts where cohabitation is 
marginal, practiced by a subpopulation with particular characteristics (Heuveline and 
Timberlake 2004; Kiernan 2001). Nevertheless, substantial differences have been found 
across countries in this region with regard to the prevalence of cohabitation and its 
function in the childbearing process (Sobotka 2003).  For instance, whereas 41% of 
Georgian women born between 1971 and 1980 were cohabiting at the birth of their first 
child, not more than 12% of their Romanian counterparts did so  (own calculations 
based on GGS data, not shown). But the predominant role of cohabitation in the union 
career also differs across countries. For instance, in Russia divorced individuals as well 
as urban residents are largely overrepresented among cohabiters (Zakharov 2008), 
whereas in Bulgaria premarital cohabitation has a long tradition, where, particularly in 
rural areas, cohabiters move in together at the moment of engagement, often into the 
house of one set of parents (Hoem and Kostova 2008). 
The extent to which cohabiting and married couples differ in their income pooling 
strategies might vary between countries for at least three reasons. First, differences in 
the  prevalence of cohabitation across countries might lead to different selection 
processes into cohabitation, as the above-mentioned examples illustrate. As a result of 
the different composition of cohabiters across countries, differences in the income 
pooling strategies of cohabiters and spouses might vary as well. In some countries only 
a minority cohabits:  in other countries virtually everyone experiences periods of 
cohabitation. In countries where only a minority cohabits those who cohabit might 
exhibit very different behavior from the married, and consequently likewise with regard 
to income pooling strategies. These initially large differences between cohabiters and 
spouses with regard to income pooling are  expected  to be strongly reduced after 
selection factors are accounted for. In countries where cohabitation is widespread 
selection into cohabitation is lower and differences in the income pooling strategies of 
cohabiters and the married are expected to be smaller, and not substantially reduced by 
taking selection factors into account. 
Second, a contrasting hypothesis on cross-national differences in cohabiters’ and 
spouses’ income pooling strategies can be derived when examining cross-national 
differences in the commitment involved in cohabitation. When cohabitation is less 
widespread, it constitutes a deviant behavior. Often, such a context is characterized by Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
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higher levels of religiousness and moral conservatism (Gault-Sherman and Draper 
2012) and, consequently, strong societal pressure to get married (Lehrer 2004). This 
may influence how cohabiters view their union, how stable the cohabitation is, and, if 
cohabiters marry, how fast they do so. When cohabitation is marginal and stigmatized 
cohabitation is likely to be short-lived and quickly transformed into marriage.  In 
countries where the decision to get married is interpreted as a consequence of high 
interpersonal commitment we would expect commitment within cohabitation to be 
higher. It has to be noted, however, that the aspiration of marriage can also indicate a 
perceived absence of alternatives to marriage and thus an expression of conformism 
(Coast 2009). If cohabiters in Central and Eastern Europe enter cohabitation 
predominantly  with the aspiration to marry soon they might adopt marriage-like 
patterns of income organization right from the start of their union. At the country level 
we would thus expect  to find smaller differences between cohabiters’ and spouses’ 
money management. In contexts where cohabitation is more prevalent and accepted, 
premarital cohabitation is viewed as a phase in the ‘normal’ life course and a significant 
proportion of cohabiters might not marry at all, either because their union dissolves 
rather than transforming into marriage— a process called “weeding” (Klijzing 1992: 
53), or they consider their union as a permanent alternative to marriage. Thus there 
might be great variation at the individual level in the commitment that is involved in 
cohabitation. In addition, in these contexts the legal protection of non-marital unions is 
often higher than in countries where cohabitation is rare (Perelli-Harris and Sánchez 
Gassen 2012;  Poortman and Mills 2012).  If income pooling strategies reflect the 
commitment of the union, differences in the money-management strategies of 
cohabiters and spouses might be larger among Western Europeans. Accounting for the 
variation in the level of commitment may, however, also reduce these differences most 
strongly in these countries. 
Finally,  country differences might arise from differences in the socio-cultural 
context, independently from differences in selection processes and levels of 
commitment. It has been argued that individualization affects the nature of intimate 
relationships and how couples manage their money. As the level of individualization 
varies across countries it could be that in countries where the level of individualization 
is high, intimate relationships are primarily entered into for the sake of satisfaction 
derived from being with that partner rather than for the social recognition or economic 
advantage gained by being in a partnership, and relationships that no longer provide 
these benefits are easily dissolved (Giddens 1992). Building on new institutional 
economics, which situates economic action into its institutional context, Lauer and 
Yodanis (2011), in a cross-national comparative study on spousal income organization, 
show that the spread of individualized marriage in a country influences spouses’ money 
management strategies. In order to maintain individual autonomy and to ease leaving Hiekel, Liefbroer & Poortman: Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples 
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the union, married couples in individualized contexts are more likely to avoid income 
pooling. Sociologists have argued that the individualization of intimate relationships is 
increasingly a feature of Western societies (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1990). Keeping 
income separate as an expression of individualistic values thus might  be more likely in 
Western Europe than in Eastern Europe.  Cohabitation—even more than marriage—
might constitute an expression of the valorization of individual autonomy, and that the 
relationship is entered into and maintained as long as it is considered self-fulfilling and 
satisfying. Thus it could be that differences between cohabiters’ and spouses’ money-
management strategies are greater  in Western Europe  than in  Eastern Europe. 
Nevertheless, given that the majority of marriages in Western Europe nowadays are 
preceded by a period of unmarried cohabitation, it could also be that spouses continue 
the money management strategies employed during cohabitation, which would lead to 
smaller differences between cohabiters and the married in Western Europe, compared to 
Eastern Europe. 
In sum, selection variables are expected to more strongly explain the effect of 
union type on income pooling in Central and Eastern Europe, as cohabiters in these 
countries are considered a more selective group than  their Western European 
counterparts. Commitment variables are expected to strongly reduce the differences 
between cohabitation and marriage in Western Europe, as cohabiters in these countries 
are expected to be more diverse with regard to the level of interpersonal commitment. 
Persistent country differences might indicate that cross-national differences in the level 
of individualization of intimate relationships exist.  
 
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Data and sample 
We analyzed data from six countries that participated in the Generations and Gender 
Surveys (GGS) that were collected in 2005 and 2006. The GGS is a panel survey of a 
nationally representative sample of the 18–79 year-old resident population in each 
participating country (Vikat et al. 2007). To date, Wave 1 data of 15 countries has been 
collected. Six of them include a comparable measurement of the money management 
strategy employed within the couple. These countries are Bulgaria, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Romania, and Russia. The overall size of the main samples differs by country 
but in most cases is  about 10,000 respondents.  Data were  usually collected by a 
computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI), and in some countries by a paper and 
pencil interview (PAPI). The overall response rates vary between 49.7% in Russia and 
78.2% in Bulgaria. Our analytical sample contains individuals who were either married Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
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or cohabited unmarried, with a heterosexual partner. Individuals who did not provide 
information on their organization of household income (n=157) or who reported to have 
an “other” manner in which they managed their money (n=474) were excluded from 
further analysis. Moreover, we excluded respondents who did not report whether they 
are married to their current partner (n=55), as well as cohabiters who did not report 
whether they have intentions to marry within three years (n=114). The analyses are 
based  on a final sample of 36,407 (88%) married individuals and 5,049  (12%) 
cohabiters.  
 
 
3.2 Measurements  
Income pooling. Our dependent variable –  the extent to which income is pooled – 
distinguished couples that kept their income at least partly separate from those that 
pooled all their income. In the GGS respondents were asked: 
“How do you and your partner/spouse organize your household income?” 
1 – I manage all the money and give my partner/spouse his/ her share 
2 – My partner/spouse manages all the money and gives me my share 
3 – We pool all the money and each takes out what we need 
4 – We pool some of the money and keep the rest separate 
5 – We each keep our own money separate 
6 – Other (Comment: only for coding, not presented in the card itself) 
In line with previous studies (Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Vogler, Brockmann 
and Wiggins 2006) we distinguished individuals who kept their income completely or 
partly separate (responses 4 and 5) from those who pooled all their income (responses 
1, 2, and 3). Pooling income is considered as the reference category. 
 
Union type. Respondents who were married and live together with their partner are 
distinguished from those who shared a household with a partner to whom they were not 
married (coded as 1). 
 
Selection factors. We included three age groups in the analysis: 18 to 35 years old, 36 to 
55 years old, and 56 to 79 years old. The data provide an internationally comparable 
measure of education  attainment  using the International Standard Classification of 
Education  ISCED  (UNESCO 2006). We distinguished three levels: 1=primary and 
lower secondary education, 2=upper secondary and post-secondary non-university 
education, and 3=all levels of university education. The data include the self-reported 
activity  status of both partners. Four categories of the division of paid labor were 
distinguished: 1=only the male partner is employed or self-employed, 2=only the Hiekel, Liefbroer & Poortman: Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples 
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female partner is employed or self-employed, 3=both are employed or self-employed, 
4=none of them is employed or self-employed.  Religiousness was measured as a 
combination of religious denomination and the frequency of visiting religious services 
(with the categories: less than once a year, once a year, less than once a month, once a 
month, less than once a week, once a week, daily). We created a scale ranging from 
1=no denomination or with denomination but visiting religious services less than once a 
year, to 6=with denomination, going daily to church. A higher value indicated a higher 
level of religiousness. 
 
Life-course events. Dummy variables were created indicating whether the respondent 
had ever been married with a former partner (coded as 1) and whether at least one 
stepchild or biological child with a former partner and below age 18 was living in the 
household. 
 
Commitment factors. The union duration has been measured in years between the date 
of interview and the date the couple started living in the same household. A dummy 
variable was created that takes the value 1 when the respondent reported at least one 
joint biological child younger than 18 years old with the current partner and living in 
the household. To measure separation thoughts, respondents were asked “Over the past 
12 months, have you thought about breaking up your relationship?” The answer 
categories were 0=no and 1=yes. 
 
Heterogeneity within cohabitation and marriage. Marital intentions of cohabiters were 
ascertained by asking whether they intended to marry their partner within the next three 
years. Respondents who answered 1=yes or 2=probably yes were considered as having 
marriage plans. Those who responded 3=probably no or 4=no were treated as having no 
marital intentions. Among spouses a distinction was  made between those who 
cohabited before marriage and those who married directly. 
 
 
3.3 Analytical approach 
First, descriptive statistics are discussed. These results provide insight into how 
cohabiters and married individuals across countries differ  in terms of selection and 
commitment measures as well as  in  income pooling strategies. Within-country 
differences between cohabiters and married have been tested for statistical significance. 
We explicitly state whenever an observed difference does not  reach statistical 
significance. Next, our hypotheses are tested by estimating binomial logistic regression Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
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models for each country separately, because the small number of countries does not 
allow the use of multi-level analysis (Hox 2010). 
Item non-response is hardly problematic, because most of the variables had an 
item-non-response rate of less than 1%. The question on separation thoughts has a high 
item non-response of around 30% in both Georgia (for unknown reasons) and France 
(as interviewers were instructed to skip the question on relationship assessment when 
the respondent’s  partner was present at the interview).  In the case of continuous 
variables with missing data,  such as partnership duration and religiousness, we 
performed value imputation using the Stata 10 “impute” command for each country 
separately. In the case of categorical variables with missing data  we created an 
additional category,  “no response”. For instance, respondents without separation 
thoughts have been compared to respondents with separation thoughts as well as those 
with a non-response. 
 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 shows for cohabiting  and married individuals by country the percent 
distribution of the variables included in our analysis. In  CEE  countries  pooling all 
income is by far the most common  manner in which couples manage their money, 
regardless  of  whether they are married or not.  With the exception of Georgia and 
Bulgaria where married and cohabiting couples do not differ significantly from each 
other in the way they organize their income, independent money management is clearly 
more frequently reported by cohabiting couples than  by  the married. Germany and 
France differ from the CEE countries in two respects. First, the share of non-poolers 
among married couples is higher (12% and 15%, respectively) than in Georgia, 
Romania, and Russia. Second, the proportion of non-poolers among cohabiting couples 
is much larger than among married couples. More than half of all cohabiting couples 
keep at least some of their money separate (51% and 58%, respectively). 
Countries vary in the prevalence of cohabitation. It is particularly uncommon in 
Romania where approximately 5%  of all co-resident unions are cohabitations. In 
Georgia, Russia, Bulgaria, and Germany, the proportion of cohabiters varies between 
10% and 15%. In France one fifth of all co-resident unions are cohabitations. More than 
half of all cohabiting individuals in Bulgaria, Russia, Germany, and France intend to 
marry their partner within three years. The vast majority of Georgian and Romanian 
cohabiters reports marital intentions for the near future (78% and 67%, respectively). 
Whereas around 50% of all currently married couples in each country experienced 
premarital cohabitation, 17% of the Romanian and 32% of the Russian married couples 
cohabited before they got married.   Hiekel, Liefbroer & Poortman: Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples 
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Table 1:  Percent distribution of income management and characteristics of 
the cohabiting and the married by country (N=41,456) 
  Bulgaria  Georgia  Romania  Russia  France  Germany 
  coh  mar  coh  mar  coh  mar  coh  mar  coh  mar  coh  mar 
Income management 
All income pooled  83.7  85.6  90.8  92.0  85.4  93.1  84.9  93.8  42.0  85.2  49.0  88.5 
At least some income kept separate  16.3  14.4  9.2  8.0  14.6  6.9  15.1  6.2  58.0  14.8  51.0  11.5 
Prevalence of cohabitation 
Cohabiting among all coresident unions  10.2    13.6    5.3    14.7    20.4    12.3   
Types of cohabitation/marriage 
Cohabiting without marital intentions  56.4    21.7    32.9    51.8    59.4    54.1   
Cohabiting with marital intentions  43.6    78.3    67.1    48.2    40.6    45.9   
Married directly    45.6    52.9    83.0    67.5    51.1    49.4 
Married after cohabitation    54.4    47.1    17.0    32.5    48.9    50.5 
Selection variables 
18–35 years old  68.8  23.3  49.7  17.6  37.4  16.6  43.3  24.8  50.5  13.4  50.8  12.8 
36–55 years old  25.9  46.1  41.8  50.6  40.5  45.9  41.2  47.9  41.1  45.0  35.9  49.5 
56+ years old  5.3  30.7  8.5  31.8  22.1  37.6  15.6  27.3  8.3  41.6  13.4  37.7 
Primary education  50.2  26.4  11.4  12.3  53.4  37.3  14.5  12.3  19.8  35.0  17.1  11.3 
Secondary education  38.5  51.2  60.8  59.5  39.9  52.7  56.6  47.7  47.5  39.9  58.6  60.0 
Tertiary education  11.4  22.3  27.8  28.2  6.8  10.1  28.9  40.0  32.7  25.1  24.2  28.8 
Only male partner employed  23.0  13.6  46.3  37.1  31.5  18.8  22.2  16.7  18.7  14.7  16.3  21.9 
Only female partner employed  13.7  12.0  7.1  9.2  8.8  8.1  10.4  9.3  7.2  8.1  11.7  7.4 
Both partners employed  32.4  44.5  21.9  23.6  31.5  37.3  48.3  46.4  64.7  45.1  53.2  43.1 
No partner employed  31.0  29.9  24.6  30.0  28.2  25.9  19.2  27.6  9.4  32.0  18.9  27.6 
Mean score religiousness scale (1–10)  2.4  2.6  2.9  2.7  3.3  3.8  1.9  1.9  1.3  1.8  1.6  2.5 
Divorced  21.9  2.8  6.7  1.3  37.6  4.5  48.7  12.2  19.6  7.3  21.4  6.0 
Child(ren) from prior unions below age 18 
in household  10.2  1.2  2.2  0.2  13.1  1.4  24.3  3.6  11.9  2.0  10.7  5.9 
Commitment variables 
Mean union duration (in years)  7.8  24.5  10.7  25.0  10.7  26.3  8.1  22.4  8.1  26.7  6.7  25.1 
Child(ren) from current union below age 
18 in household  56.7  50.1  73.2  50.4  35.8  41.1  26.0  49.9  45.1  42.0  25.4  38.6 
With separation thoughts  5.6  2.2  2.9  1.8  6.3  1.8  26.9  13.8  14.1  4.7  13.5  3.8 
TOTAL NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  845  7,420  5,430  857  444  8,003  945  5,501  1,211  4,723  747  5,330 
 
Note: Generations and Gender Surveys 2005/06. 
 
Cohabiters in all countries are on average  younger than married individuals; 
cohabiters in CEE countries are in general older than cohabiters in Germany and 
France. In all countries except Georgia the educational  attainment of married and 
cohabiting respondents differs significantly. In Romania and Bulgaria most cohabiters Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
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have  only  completed a low level of educational  attainment  (around 50%),  whereas 
married respondents are more likely to be highly educated. In Russia and Germany 
these differences are smaller. French cohabiters,  by contrast,  are on average higher 
educated than married individuals. Regarding the division of paid labor, we find that 
more than half of French and German cohabiters live in unions in which both partners 
are employed. The male breadwinner model is more prevalent in Central and Eastern 
Europe, and in particular among cohabiters in Georgia and Romania. Both cohabiting 
and married respondents in Romania on average score highest on the religiousness 
scale, whereas Russian respondents, regardless of union status, and German cohabiters 
are the least religious. Apart from Russia and Georgia where the differences do not 
reach statistical significance, cohabiters are less religious than married individuals. In 
all countries cohabiters report much more frequently that they have been previously 
married. Although this proportion varies strongly across countries and is highest in 
Russia and Romania (48% and 38%, respectively), the difference between married and 
cohabiting individuals is remarkably large in all countries. Living together with children 
below age 18 from prior unions is much more common among cohabiters and 
particularly prevalent in Russia. In all countries the average partnership duration of 
cohabiting unions is shorter than that of marriages. The difference between cohabiters 
and spouses is largest in Germany, with 6 years for cohabiting versus approximately 25 
years for married couples. Between a quarter (Germany, Russia) and 73% (Georgia) of 
all cohabiting unions involve at least one joint biological child with the partner. Neither 
married nor cohabiting individuals are likely to have thought about breaking up with 
their partner during the last year. Among those who did cohabiters are largely 
overrepresented, in particular in Germany and France, but also in Bulgaria, Georgia, 
and Romania. Cohabiters are overrepresented among those with separation thoughts in 
Russia as well. The peculiarity of Russia is that these kinds of thoughts are relatively 
prevalent among married respondents as well. 
In order to replicate previous findings and test Hypothesis 1, that cohabiters are 
more likely to keep money separate, we conducted a logistic regression analysis with 
independent money management as the dependent variable and union type as the only 
independent variable,  for each country separately  (results not shown).  With the 
exception of Bulgaria and Georgia where the effect of union type on income pooling 
does not reach statistical significance, cohabiters are more likely than married 
respondents to opt for independent money management. Against our expectation that 
differences between cohabiters and spouses are initially larger in CEE countries where 
cohabitation is marginal, we find German and French cohabiters to have 8.0 times 
higher odds of keeping money separate, whereas in Romania and Russia cohabiters’ 
odds of independent money management are  increased  by 2.7 and 2.3 times, 
respectively. Hiekel, Liefbroer & Poortman: Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples 
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In Hypothesis 2 we assumed that the variation in income pooling strategies of 
cohabiting and married individuals  would  be strongly reduced after controlling for 
selection into cohabitation, as the differences between cohabiters’ and spouses’ income 
organization would derive from individual characteristics associated with the entry into 
cohabitation.  Table  2 shows the results of  a logistic regression analysis of the 
association between union type and income pooling when selection processes into 
cohabitation and independent money management are controlled for. 
We do indeed find that keeping income separate is associated with variables that 
are considered to select individuals into cohabitation,  although not in all countries. 
Individuals in the oldest age group are most likely to keep money separate in CEE 
countries, but the effect reaches statistical significance only in Georgia and Russia. This 
finding contradicts our assumptions and might be counter-intuitive. It is, however, in 
line with previous research, and has been explained as a strategic response of older 
individuals to country-specific inheritance tax regulations and medical care payments 
(Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte 2011; Treas 1993). In 
France and Germany the age affect is reversed, but as we will show below the effect 
turns positive and significant when we include measurements  of  interpersonal 
commitment. In line with prior studies we find that university-educated individuals are 
more likely to keep money separate. In accordance with our theoretical expectation, 
strong labor market participation of both partners and a female-breadwinner model 
increases the likelihood of keeping  separate purses. Surprisingly, we find religious 
people to be slightly more likely to opt for separate purses in Georgia and Russia. In 
line with our assumptions we also find previously married respondents to be more 
likely to pursue individual money management. The presence of children from prior 
unions in the household decreases the odds of separate purses only in Germany. We 
thus find little  empirical evidence that individuals avoid pooling resources  when 
children from prior unions are living in the household. 
When selection variables are included in the model the effect of cohabitation on 
keeping money separate becomes statistically significant in Bulgaria and Georgia. In 
Romania and Russia the effect of union type remains virtually unchanged, whereas in 
Germany and France the differences between cohabiters and the married are smaller 
when selection is taken into account. Despite differences in the characteristics of 
cohabiters in Western Europe compared to Central and Eastern Europe, our findings 
suggest that selection processes into independent money management operate in similar 
ways  across countries.  Against our expectation  that  selection factors would  explain 
more of the variation in CEE countries where cohabitation is less widespread, we find 
that considering selection into cohabitation reveals differences in money management 
strategies  between  cohabitation and marriage in Bulgaria and Georgia,  but  hardly 
accounts for variation in two other Central and Eastern European countries. By contrast, Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
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taking selection into account explains some of the variation in income pooling strategies 
by union type in Germany and France. Across Europe the effect of union type on 
money management remains large. The odds ratio of separate purses among cohabiters 
ranges between 1.3 in Georgia and 7.0 in Germany,  after controlling for selection 
processes. 
 
Table 2:  Summary of logistic regression Analysis (e
B) for variables predicting 
independent money management by union type for cohabiters 
(n=5,049) and the married (n=36,407), controlling for selection 
processes 
  Bulgaria  Georgia  Romania  Russia  France  Germany 
Union type (ref. married) 
Cohabiting  1.60***  1.32**  2.45***  2.74***  5.92***  7.03*** 
Age (ref. 18–35 years) 
36–55 years old  1.07  0.97  1.02  0.93  0.71***  0.90 
56+ years old  1.24†  1.31**  1.21  1.13**  0.75**  0.95 
Education (ref. primary education) 
Secondary education  1.74***  1.01  1.23**  1.23  1.52***  1.17 
Tertiary education  2.64***  1.40**  1.50**  1.69**  3.37***  1.83*** 
Division of labor (ref. male employed) 
Female employed  1.30**  2.64***  1.58**  1.41†  2.14***  1.34† 
Both employed  1.49***  2.40***  2.02***  1.59**  2.00***  2.27*** 
None employed  0.98  2.57***  1.24  0.88  0.99  0.97 
Religiousness (cont.)  1.00  1.07**  1.05  1.12**  0.97  0.98 
Marriage history (ref. not divorced) 
Divorced  0.87  0.88  1.40**  1.21  2.52***  2.04*** 
Fertility history (ref. no child from prior union) 
Child prior union  0.88  1.90  0.69  0.77  1.08  0.89 
Constant  0.07***  0.03***  0.03***  0.03***  0.08***  0.07*** 
χ
2  -3346.6  -1721.7  -2170.5  -1658.8  -2599.2  -2327.8 
Pseudo R
2   0.03  0.03  0.02  0.04  0.20  0.14 
df   11  11    11  11  11 
 
Note: Generations and Gender Surveys 2005/06. †p< .1 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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In  Hypothesis 3 we assumed that differences in the income organization of 
cohabiters and the married would derive from variation in the level of interpersonal 
commitment, both within cohabitation and marriage. In order to test that hypothesis we 
added  to the model union duration, presence of joint biological children in the 
household, and separation thoughts. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3:  Summary of logistic regression Analysis (e
B) for variables predicting 
independent money management by union type for cohabiters 
(n=5,049) and the married (n=36,407), controlling for selection 
processes (omitted from table) and level of commitment 
  Bulgaria  Georgia  Romania  Russia  France  Germany 
Union type (ref. married) 
Cohabiting  1.60***  1.29†  2.32***  2.11***  3.93***  4.62*** 
Union duration   0.99**  0.99  1.00  0.98***  0.95***  0.97*** 
Fertility history current union (ref. no joint child) 
Joint child  0.65***  0.88  0.73**  0.89  0.64***  0.62*** 
Evaluation relationship (ref: no separation thoughts) 
Sep. thoughts  2.83***  1.74***  4.55***  2.44***  2.22***  1.52** 
Constant  0.11***  0.04***  0.03***  0.03***  0.17***  0.13*** 
χ
2  -3314.2  -1716.2  -2139.3  -1624.7  -2515.7  -2295.6 
Pseudo R
2
 
  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.22  0.15 
df   14  14  14  14  14  14 
 
Note: Generations and Gender Surveys 2005/06. †p< .1 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Including the commitment measures decreases the effect of union type on money 
management strategies in all countries. In Georgia differences between cohabiting and 
married individuals remain only marginally statistically significant. The effects of the 
selection variables remain virtually unchanged, with the exception of the effects of two 
variables (results not shown). First, older age turns from a negative to a positive effect 
in Germany and France, and thus becomes in line with findings from all other countries. 
Second, the negative association between the presence of children from prior unions in 
the household and separate purses reaches marginal statistical significance in Romania 
and statistical significance at the .05 level in Germany. Likelihood ratio tests reveal that 
controlling for interpersonal commitment significantly improved the model fit for each 
of these countries. Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
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The longer the union duration, the lower the likelihood that a couple keeps income 
separate. The effect of union duration is particularly strong in Western countries where 
the effect of union type decreases strongly after partnership duration is controlled for 
(step-wise models not reported but available upon request). As expected, joint 
biological children significantly decrease the odds of separate purses in four out of six 
countries, suggesting that a couple’s financial lives get more intertwined when partners 
share the  responsibility for a joint child. Separation thoughts turn out to be very 
strongly linked to  income pooling patterns  in all countries. Respondents who 
considered breaking up with their partner during the last year have a strongly increased 
likelihood of keeping money separate. 
Although including commitment factors reduces the cross-national variation in the 
effect of cohabitation on independent money management it remains significant and 
varies between 1.3 in Georgia and 4.6 in Germany. 
Finally, in Hypothesis 4 we expected that taking into account cohabiters’ marriage 
plans and married individuals’ cohabitation experience might explain differences in the 
income organization of both union types. Table 4 presents the results of a regression 
model that replaces the dichotomized union type variable by a fourfold typology in 
order to test within-group heterogeneity. 
In all countries both types of married individuals—those who married directly and 
those who did so after cohabitation with their spouse—are less likely to keep money 
separate than cohabiters. Only in Romania and France do we observe statistically 
significant differences in the income pooling strategies of  both groups of married 
respondents. Whereas Romanian spouses who cohabited before they got married are 
less  likely to keep money separate than those who married directly, French ex- 
cohabiters are—as hypothesized—more likely to keep money separate than those who 
married directly.  For the other countries  these results indicate that income pooling 
strategies within a marriage are not associated with premarital cohabitation. We thus 
found little support  for the assumption that  premarital cohabitation is relevant for 
income pooling strategies within marriage. 
Apart from Bulgaria and Georgia where  no or only marginal differences were 
observed between any of the cohabitation and marriage types, we find that cohabiters 
with marriage plans differ from the married couples less than cohabiters without such 
plans. Cohabiters who do not have short-term marriage intentions have higher odds of 
keeping separate at least some of their income than the ‘marriage-minded’ cohabiters. 
Differences between both types of cohabiters are only statistically significant in Russia, 
Germany, and France.  We thus find some empirical support for within-group 
heterogeneity among cohabiters with regard to income organization. 
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Table 4:  Summary of logistic regression Analysis (e
B) for variables predicting 
independent money management by two types of cohabiters 
(n=5,049) and two types of married (n=36,407), controlling for 
selection processes and level of commitment (omitted from table) 
  Bulgaria  Georgia  Romania  Russia  France  Germany 
Union type (ref. married directly) 
Married after 
cohabitation  1.06  0.98  0.67**  1.13  1.47***  1.14 
Cohabit with 
marriage plans  1.38†  1.22  2.00**  1.74**  4.09***  4.16*** 
Cohabit without 
marriage plans  1.35†  1.43  2.19**  2.72***  6.42***  5.89*** 
Constant  0.11***  0.04***  0.04***  0.03***  0.13***  0.12*** 
χ
2  -3313.8  -1715.9  -2134.5  -1621.6  -2502.9  -2292.2 
Pseudo R
2  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.06  0.13  0.15 
df  16  16  16  16  16  16 
 
Note: Generations and Gender Surveys 2005/06. †p< .1 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
In this paper cohabiting and married couples were compared with regard to their 
income pooling strategies across different countries. The aim was to examine the extent 
to which cohabiters and the married differ in their income pooling strategies, and to 
analyze whether the factors that account for these differences vary across countries. In 
accordance with prior research (Elizabeth 2001;  Hamplova and Le Bourdais 2009; 
Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte 2011; Vogler, Brockmann 
and Wiggins 2008)  support was found for  Hypothesis 1 that cohabiters are more 
inclined towards independent money management in four of the six countries. We did 
not find such differences in Georgia and Bulgaria. We can imagine two explanations. 
First, cohabiting unions in these countries tend to be particularly short-lived and the 
predominant exit from cohabitation is  marriage rather than  separation (own cohort 
analysis of the cumulative incidence of marriage and separation as two competing 
events based on GGS data, not shown). Thus it could be that cohabiters adapt income 
pooling as the predominant way in which money is organized within marriage right 
from the start of their union. Second, as we have discussed earlier, income pooling 
might be an expression of economic constraints rather than an individual preference and Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
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couples might need to pool all their resources to make ends meet. Within our sample of 
countries Georgia and Bulgaria have the lowest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and are 
particularly poor European countries (The World Bank 2012). It could thus be that 
independent money management is not feasible for couples in these countries, 
regardless of their marital status. 
We examined the relevance of selection in explaining the differences between 
cohabiters’ and spouses’ money management. Although several potential selection 
factors were related to income pooling, these factors were hardly capable of explaining 
the relationship between union type and income pooling strategy. We find that older 
individuals, those with a university degree, unions in which the female or both partners 
are  highly attached to the  labor  market,  and  the  previously divorced  (in Western 
Europe) to be more inclined to keep money separate. These results replicate findings for 
other countries (Burgoyne and Morison 1997;  Hamplova and Le Bourdais 2009; 
Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Lyngstad, Noack and Tufte 2011; Treas 1993; Vogler, 
Brockmann and Wiggins 2008).  In all countries the effect of cohabitation on 
independent money management remained considerable, implying that the selection 
factors considered here were not explaining much of the differences in the income 
pooling strategies of cohabiting and married couples, and if they did, they did so more 
in contexts where cohabitation is more prevalent. Given the popularity of the selection 
hypothesis, our findings suggest that selection cannot be the whole story and that it is 
likely that there must be inherent differences between cohabitation and marriage that 
influence how couples manage their money. Selection, however, might still play a role. 
We could only include a limited number of selection factors that have been discussed in 
the literature and our choice might not be exhaustive. Particularly for the Eastern 
European countries very little is known about the selection processes into cohabitation, 
and we might have missed factors attracting individuals to cohabitation and individual 
money management in these societies. 
Next, we examined the assumption that inherent differences between cohabitation 
and marriage concerning the relationship itself explain this variation. We do indeed find 
that differences in the interpersonal commitment of cohabiting and married couples are 
associated with their money management strategies. Differences between cohabiting 
and married couples were strongly reduced (particularly in Germany and France) after 
controlling for union duration in four of the six countries. The longer a relationship 
lasts, the more entangled the partners’ lives become and the more likely it becomes that 
they opt for pooled economic resources. First, our results imply that the different 
average union duration of cohabiting and married relationships accounts for a lot of the 
variation in the money management within both union types. This is in line with the 
findings of Lyngstad et al. (2011)  for Norway. Most of the previous studies on 
cohabiters’ money management,  however,  did not include union duration in their Hiekel, Liefbroer & Poortman: Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples 
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analysis (Hamplova and Le Bourdais 2009; Vogler, Brockmann and Wiggins 2008). 
Second, these findings suggest that long-term cohabiters are likely to behave more 
similarly to married couples in the economic organization of their household income. 
This is interesting because it is widely assumed that long-term cohabiting unions are the 
most ideologically inspired ones. If so, it suggests that there are institutional pressures 
on these couples that make them pool their incomes (e.g., buying a house together). 
Joint biological children below age 18 are associated with lower odds of keeping 
money separate. This finding suggests  that a couple’s financial lives get more 
intertwined when they have joint responsibility for a biological child. This finding has 
important implications,  as an increasing number of children are born to cohabiting 
parents. It suggests that the presence of children might become an increasingly crucial 
determinant in the money management strategy of couples, regardless of the union type 
they are in. Despite on-going changes in individuals’ living arrangements and family 
context, parenthood encourages financial solidarity within a couple, whether the parents 
are married or not. 
In line with our expectations, separation thoughts were associated with a higher 
likelihood  of keeping income separate. We argued that thinking about breaking up 
signifies low commitment, which in turn discourages individuals to pool their income. 
However, some sort of reversed causality could be operative as well. The absence of a 
joint pool could cause or signify a lower commitment to the partner and in turn lead to 
thoughts about separation. Longitudinal data are needed to shed light on this issue. 
In three of the six countries (Germany, France, Russia) cohabiters with marriage 
plans are less likely to keep money separate than cohabiters without marital intentions, 
a finding also reported by Lyngstad and colleagues (2011)  for Norway. Cohabiters 
anticipating marriage might already have a preference for joint finances or might start 
adopting marriage-like behaviors after the decision to get married has been made. This 
difference within the group of cohabiters stresses the importance of  taking the 
heterogeneity among cohabiters into account. Cohabiters anticipating marriage behave 
more similarly to married couples than cohabiters not thinking about getting married. 
We find little support for the hypothesis that married couples who cohabited before 
their marriage are more likely to keep money separate during marriage than those who 
married straight away. The only exception is France, where virtually all co-resident 
unions start by unmarried cohabitation. Those  who marry directly thus  constitute a 
selective group, and their high likelihood to have joint money management might be 
related more to religiousness or conservatism than to different levels of interpersonal 
commitment. 
Although we were able to illustrate the existence of substantial heterogeneity in 
income pooling strategies among both cohabiting and married couples the effect of 
cohabitation on keeping money separate remained strong and significant. This finding Demographic Research: Volume 30, Article 55 
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could indicate that the institution of marriage induces a couple to attach a special 
significance to their relationship that differs substantively from cohabitation. In contrast 
to cohabitation, marriage is a social institution, legally regulated and surrounded by 
clear social expectations about how a married couple should behave. The norms 
concerning marriage also concern financial arrangements such as material support and 
inheritance, and thus offer an institutional framework for mutual solidarity between 
spouses. Hence, marriage seems to be strongly associated with joint finances in all 
countries included in our study. This finding implies that marriage is such a strong 
institution that it mainstreams prior cohabiters. Since the decision as to whether to pool 
income has to be made by every couple at some point in the course of their relationship, 
the availability of longitudinal data for future research would allow examining at what 
point in the course of an intimate relationship the decision to pool income is being 
made, as well as which couples change their money management over time. 
Another limitation of this study is that we do not differentiate between partial 
pooling and keeping all income separate. Burgoyne and colleagues (2007) identified 
partial pooling as a distinct money management strategy, as it shares similarities with 
both independent money management and complete pooling. Couples employing partial 
pooling manage a significant proportion of the income independently, but both partners 
have access to joint money for collective expenses. We acknowledge this important 
distinction, which is particularly relevant in thinking about its consequences for access 
to and control of financial resources within couples. Our data did not allow us to further 
distinguish among those not pooling all of their resources as the number of observations 
is too small. 
Finally, we explored whether country differences in the effect of union type on 
income pooling strategies  were related to different selection processes into money 
management strategies  across countries or cross-national variation in the level of 
commitment in cohabitation and marriage.  We find that selection processes into 
independent money operate in similar  ways across countries, despite the cohabiting 
populations differing  in some characteristics.  Therefore our results suggest that 
selection explains little of the differences between cohabiters’ and spouses’ different 
ways  of  managing  money.  Variation in commitment factors,  however,  cannot 
exhaustively explain the variation in cohabiters’ and spouses’ income pooling strategies 
in different contexts. 
It might be that the money management strategy that a couple pursues is not only 
the outcome of an individual preference, but also mirrors  constraints. The socio-
economic context of cohabiters might thus play a role in how feasible it is to keep 
money separate. Cohabiters in CEE countries are characterized by a lower level of 
educational attainment and participation in the labor market, both compared to married 
individuals in their country and compared to cohabiters in Western Europe. For them Hiekel, Liefbroer & Poortman: Income pooling strategies among cohabiting and married couples 
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the question of whether money should be kept separate might simply not come up, 
because these couples need all their money to keep things running, even if the couple 
has ideological qualms about it. This explanation is supported by our finding that 
differences in the money management of cohabiters and spouses in Central and Eastern 
Europe are small to begin with, and hardly influenced by selection or commitment 
variables. In prosperous countries where people earn more than they need for their basic 
needs the idea of keeping at least some of the money separate in order to increase 
individual autonomy might make sense. 
Nevertheless, the level of commitment accounts better for the variation in Western 
European countries than in Central and Eastern Europe. Another explanation of the 
persistent country differences could thus be that  the more normative cohabitation 
becomes, the more diverse the cohabiting population in terms of commitment involved. 
The persistence of country differences in the extent to which cohabiters are more likely 
to keep money separate gives some indication of the notion that Western European 
relationships are indeed more individualized, but also that cohabitation is a particularly 
individualized union type. In Western Europe individualistic and postmodern values are 
highly accepted. People in these countries might therefore abstain from income pooling 
for ideological reasons such as maintaining their individual autonomy, even though 
they are highly committed to their partner. Cohabitation,  even more than marriage, 
might be an expression of holding such individualized values. As a consequence levels 
of commitment cannot exhaustively explain why cohabiters are more likely to keep 
their money separate than married couples.  Alternatively, it could be that even in 
Western Europe, where cohabitation is common and accepted, keeping money separate 
during cohabitation might be a norm itself. When common sense does not expect 
cohabiters to pool economic resources, cohabiters might be less likely to do so. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, by contrast, norms to pool income within a couple might 
be particularly strong, regardless of  whether the partners are married or not. When 
keeping income separate is considered a particular deviant behavior it is not very likely 
to occur. 
We  explored interesting  country differences in the  six countries we examined, 
hereby opening promising avenues for future research. Analyzing countries separately 
does not provide the empirically appropriate test of the effect of the institutional 
context. When data on more countries is available it will be possible to directly test for 
their impact on money management strategies  multi-level models that include both 
individual and country-level indicators. 
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